Volume 17

Issue 6

Article 7

1972

The Role of Law in Educational Decision Making
John H. Vanderzell
Donald W. Dowd
Matthew W. Finkin
Mark R. Shedd

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment
Commons, and the Juvenile Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John H. Vanderzell, Donald W. Dowd, Matthew W. Finkin & Mark R. Shedd, The Role of Law in Educational
Decision Making, 17 Vill. L. Rev. 1052 (1972).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss6/7

This Symposia is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

Vanderzell et al.: The Role of Law in Educational Decision Making

1052

VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17 : p. 993

THE ROLE OF LAW IN EDUCATIONAL
DECISION MAKING
PANEL DISCUSSION

PROFESSOR DOWD: As I suggested before, we thought we
would begin this session with some sort of reaction from the panel
to the presentations, followed by questions from the audience.
Dean Vanderzell, do you have any further words of wisdom or
criticism?
DEAN VANDERZELL: There were a number of things that
were exciting to me. In one sense, I have been able to avoid some of
the problems that we have talked about, because I have been able, so
far, to assume that they were someone else's problems. Mr. Finkin
raised some points which were of particular interest to me. One was
his indication of the ambivalent roles of the faculty, i.e., the employeeemployer relation as opposed to the managerial function that faculty
members perform. It might be important to add that, at least in my
college, the faculty members are thought of as general officers of the
college. I suppose that is a managerial function except that, by general
officer of the college, I mean he is responsible for the continuing and
ongoing existence of the college and for characterizing its aspirations.
I find it very difficult to conceive of the operation of my college in the
absence of its being defined by the aspirations of the faculty, since a
college is only what the aspirations of its faculty make it.
There was another point Mr. Finkin raised and one which I would
have raised had I delivered my paper. It concerns the grounds upon
which one might consider the suitability of a faculty member remaining on the campus. There is no question that academic freedom and
the first amendment have been joined, and good institutions, I think,
not only applaud that development but have no difficulty in operating
within that context. The problem occurs when, or if, those faculty
members who are the poorest performers as scholars and as teachers,
are, at the same time, the most robust in their exercise of academic
freedom and first amendment rights. I think that is a very real problem, and one to which I alluded when I suggested that there were
some who insist that the reasons given for nonrenewal of contracts
were not the real reasons at all.
MR. FINKIN: I profited enormously from listening to this discussion. For one thing, I have found that I am really out of touch
with a lot of the constitutional developments. I think there are some
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problems which confront both secondary and higher education in a
similar fashion. I also think there are some that are vastly dissimilar.
Before I get into that, let me say that I appreciate the problems of
faculty members on campus. On a national level, the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) has handled about 880
complaints of violations of its standards this year. I recall one complainant whose contract was not being renewed and who was contesting
the nonrenewal on a variety of grounds. I asked him what he understood to be the reasons for the nonrenewal. He wrote me: "I am
being nonrenewed at this college for only two reasons - one is the
full use of my academic freedom and the other is my abrasive personality." Let me say, that with respect to some of the problems facing
the public schools, I think that higher education has already faced
them. We have relatively well-developed codes of procedure on a
variety of issues, including treatment of student discipline cases. There
are certain customs, norms, and usages traditionally set by the better
institutions and, in fact, by the AAUP, which other institutions then
examine and try to emulate. I do not know how much longer that
"old school" attitude is going to endure in higher education.
The incoming professoriate -

junior faculty -

enter with very

different attitudes than the senior faculty they replace. I think, for
example, the draft situation has contributed significantly to make
higher education an attractive career. Some people may, therefore, not
go into college teaching for the love of teaching or of scholarship, but
rather to avoid the draft. However, as long as they are present at the
institution they make demands on that institution.
I think one of the trends which the public schools are confronting, is the advent of a kind of legalization. Things will no longer be
done by custom or norm. Instead, there will have to be formal procedures set down, followed, and sanctioned through some process,
whether sanctioned by the courts, an arbitration board, or some agency
of formal character. It seems to me that some of this legalization is
not bad. For example, if a professor wears an armband about the
Vietnam war and is fired because of it, he ought to have the right to
have that decision reviewed, especially if the reasons given to him are
spurious. There ought to be a way, procedurally, to protect his academic freedom. On the other hand, the procedure should not be so
elaborate that the sense of discretion that professional people must
have in making certain kinds of judgments is lost. I guess essentially
what I am concerned about, is the advent of a kind of creeping legalism,
whereby the decisions by administrators, faculty members, faculty
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committees, and departments will be made not according to the merits
of the situation, but rather, with a view toward how they would stand
muster by a court or arbitrator. In some institutions with which I
deal, I see a growing concern, not with the merits of the decision, but
with adherence to form, that is, second-guessing what a court or arbitrator might require. I think that if that state of mind does take root
in our institutions, it would change the way the institutions have
traditionally been operated, and such a change would, in my view, be
very much for the worse.
DR. SHEDD: I was particularly pleased to hear Professor
Valente refer to the need, on the part of the people who work in the
public and non-public elementary and secondary schools, to have access
to legal advice and counsel which will be required to develop new
responses to new problems. Hopefully, they will try to anticipate the
crest of the wave that very often rises to engulf them when certain
problems develop which involve relationships among students, teachers,
administrators, and in some instances, parents. It does seem to me
that, while there are legal aspects to many of the problems that we
experience in the day-to-day operation of the schools, many of these
concern relationships among the parties of interest, and conflict could
be avoided with foreknowledge on the part of responsible school
officials. Some kind of mechanism could be developed - hopefully
with the cooperation of people with legal backgrounds, faculty and
students of law schools and committee members of the various bar
associations - whereby those people who have to live and work
together in a school situation may do so in an amicable way. That
does not involve a comment, but is an enlargement upon an idea that
I was happy to hear Professor Valente make.
MR. JOHNSTON: I, too, want to respond to some of the remarks by Professor Valente. While I agree with most of what he said
and while I found his summary helpful, I thought that, from my point
of view, he left a false impression that the problem for educators is
really more difficult than it seems to be. He did not point out that
it is a problem that policemen have solved and one with which other
public administrators have had to solve. All that the problem requires,
it seems to me, and I do insist that it requires this, is that public
officials have some reason for their actions and that they understand
that the more they interfere with the prerogatives and rights of individuals, the better the reason must be. It seems to me that no one
is better qualified to make a decision about whether or not the reason
is good enough, at least in the first instance, in the educational con-
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text, than the professional educator. So long as they have this understanding, I do not think anybody is going to get into very much trouble.
I think the problem arises from something else that Professor
Valente suggested. It is true that the United States Supreme Court
or the President or Congress can make a law, but to have people
follow it is something else. It is frequently true, that district court
judges, do not always follow what reasonable men would perceive to
be the clear mandate of the Supreme Court. Of course, they can do
that, as can school administrators, with the assurance that very, very
few cases ever reach the United States Supreme Court, and therefore,
the chances of successfully ignoring such a mandate are very good. If
that is the way in which one wants to approach the problem, then I
think he first has to ask the question: "What kind of example of
citizenship is this for the students that are in my school system?"
And second, he has to consider the effects on his professional career,
especially if he either appears before a judge who follows the decision
of the United States Supreme Court or if he is involved in that one
case in a thousand that comes before the United States Supreme
Court. Our federal district court, from the beginning, has felt that it
is a violation of the right of privacy for a school to force students to
cut their hair. We have attempted to secure compliance with this
view, not by suing every school principal in the state, which is practically what we would have had to do, but rather simply by calling
them on the telephone and talking to them about it. If school administrators understand that there must be a reason for what they do, and
the more someone is affected the more justifiable the reason should be,
it will be the best educational example one can offer students whose
education is entrusted to him. I do not think any educator will encounter any serious trouble by following this approach. I believe that
the instances where public school administrators have to consult attorneys before they make decisions will become fewer and fewer as people
use this new approach.
PROFESSOR VALENTE: I would like to make clear, if I
have not already, that my reason for suggesting that public school
administrators, in fact any school administrator, structure their regulations or their ad hoc directives with a view to rationality and fairness, is basically to serve the same interests that Mr. Johnston
mentioned. I do not mean to imply that, if they have their wits about
them, they will be able to skirt the law. But, I do feel that they have
very serious judgmental problems, and if they do not solve them at
the administrative level, we are going to have this creeping legalism
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to which Mr. Finkin referred. It is a very real danger for two reasons.
First, educators will try to think like lawyers, or think legalistically,
and thereby lose their perspective and their primary goal as educators.
Second, and what is worse, while the courts are protectors, they can
also become tyrannical. By this I mean, if decisions are constantly
exported to the courts, it may well be that in different circuits you
will have different ground rules, which in fact is what we have today.
We have it .in hair, we have it in armbands and various forms of
expression, we -have it in housekeeping controls, and we have it in
controls of associational activities, higher and lower. I think this
situation is most unfortunate.
I would hope that there will be compliance with the law but that
the regulations will be primarily good sound educational decisions,
rather than simply good legal decisions. The AAUP has adopted
codes on student rights, which have been specifically acknowledged
and confirmed as fair and reasonable in some of our courts. The code
of student rights and responsibilities in the AAUP statement, as I
recall, spells out a fair and reasonable way of handling these problems,
as well as what rights ought to be expected. To me this is much
more desirable at the lower educational level than what has happened
in one of the midwestern federal courts. There the court had a very
complicated problem of disruption at the 'higher educational level and
issued what, in effect, was a code. They called it guidelines and regulations, but, in reality, it was a very extensive code. In effect, this
was the utilization of an administrative scheme by a court rather than
by an administration, which is unfortunate. Given a very conservative
Supreme Court considering these problems, the result may be an imposition on a scale not imagined. I believe that some judicial intrusion
is necessary but there are dangers. For this reason, I believe that
consensus-approved codes or procedures, involving the participation of
the faculty and students, may keep the community happy and stable
by protecting the rights of individuals and keeping education out
of the courts.
It seems to me that the legalization of education is every bit as
dangerous as the politicalization of education that we have today.
Students who are seniors in high school today have more than just
a strong voice based upon their constitutional rights; they may be a
political force one year later in an election. It is apparent to me that
there is a danger here if the community is not governed by an appropriate hierarchy of authority, because then we unfortunately get in-

volved in this legalism. I think some legalism is necessary, but I think,
if carried too far, it could be very unfortunate.
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PROFESSOR DOWD: Thank you very much Professor Valente. Any other comments from the panel?
DR. SHEDD: I would like to raise one question which relates
to two aspects of the law and national education policy. One has to do
with the implications of Serrano1 and the other has to do with what I,
as a layman, view as a constitutional crisis concerning the whole issue
of busing. Is there anyone here who would care to comment on the
status of those two issues today and how they might develop in the
years ahead?
PROFESSOR VALENTE: The Villanova Law Review is
publishing a Comment on Serrano which I have not reviewed as yet,
but I have been told generally of its scope. The problems raised there
match my own impression, although I think the student writer is a
lot closer to the mark than I am. The primary problem focuses on
school finance. Courts could achieve equalization of educational opportunity by forcing redistricting which would, in time, force a better
allocation of present tax revenue, including the property tax. That is
one approach. However, it seems to me that the approach taken in
Serrano, that you must change the tax base, is quite radical. It is a
potential approach, but the major problem is in implementation and
enforcement. In attempting to mandate a change of the tax base, the
Court must take on, not an individual official through the coercive
power of contempt, but an entire state legislature - and that is quite
an undertaking. There is a serious question whether they could force
compliance because it is my understanding that despite the several
rulings along the Serrano line, the legislatures are not rushing to
change the tax base and the revenue base for public education. This
lack of action indicates a practical problem that does not seem to be
resolving itself very satisfactorily. I hope that answers your question.
MR. JOHNSTON: I would just like to point out, as a former
state legislator, that the inaction is because the legislatures have not
heard of Serrano yet.
PROFESSOR DOWD: I think that the busing issue points
out a very serious problem that the educator is concerned with, as are
the courts. That is, when you read an opinion of the Court, how much
good faith is necessary in interpreting that opinion? What is the
opinion sensitizing us to? It seems to me that the courts, in some instances, are sensitizing the educators to the fact that there are problems
1. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971)
(en banc).
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that they had not considered, i.e., the problem of the student as a
citizen and the problem of the teacher as an operating force within
the university. Rather than taking from these decisions a code or set
of procedures, educators, should read these cases to discover the particular "interest" the court is protecting and how that interest is to be
effectuated. Therefore, if this were the thrust of the reading of court
decisions, then a good deal less legalization could take place.
In the case of busing, I have rather strong opinions, but I think
the main problem is that most people do not understand, or have not
had explained to them, the meaning of the Supreme Court decisions
relating to segregation. What is the policy? Is the policy better
schools or the elimination of segregation? I think people very often
have been misled as to the policy of those decisions. However, I hope
administrators will read the decisions we have been discussing with
more good faith and with more intent to give effect to the policies
underlying these decisions.
COMMENT: In terms of what Mr. Finkin described as the
problem of creeping legalism, I think one of the problems that comes
up, in conjunction with the advance of collective bargaining agreements among university professors, is that the handbooks issued by a
particular university and treated almost as a contract or a means of
understanding the relationship between the faculty and administration,
frequently are not consistent with the norms of custom and usage.
Therefore, there are an increasing number of polls to determine the
actual practice, compared to the handbook statement, in an attempt to
determine what is a managerial person or supervisory person and who,
in fact, is exercising what kind of authority. I think the response for
some universities will be to rewrite the handbooks with far greater
specificity as to what, in fact, will be the operative procedure, instead
of what has traditionally occurred within departments or within various divisions of the university. I think that is a problem which
legalism, if you will, has already created as a result of some of the
early litigation in this area.
The other comment that I would make concerns a need for
standards. Professor Valente talked about it in his earlier remarks the failure of Tinker2 to set forth guidelines to which school administrators might conform their regulatory notions. On the other hand,
he is critical of the fact that a court, in fact, created a code of guidelines and operative procedures. The problem, it seems to me, is that
the lawyers framing the petitions and requesting the relief are the ones
2. Tinker v. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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best in control of the parameters of the decision. If the issue is what
is the wrong in a particular case and why it is wrong, then it does not
become a whole codification but rather some guidelines of the conduct
that will or will not be tolerated. I think if you look at the prisoners'
rights cases, the busing decisions on desegregation, and the tax decisions on school finance, you will find that the courts have been very
reluctant to interpose their judgment for what is, in fact, administrative or legislative discretion. Rather, the courts have set some
guidelines and have only thrown out or rewritten others, as in the case
of reapportionment plans, where there has been a complete failure of
good faith or of adherence to the guidelines. I do not think there is
any decision that I have seen on the subject of re-integration of education where they have gone so far, except perhaps in the case which
Professor Valente alluded to, to literally create a code or rewrite
the tax base. They have suggested alternatives that will be acceptable,
among one of which is busing, but they have not talked in terms of
how and where and under what specifics it will be done. I think that,
if you use the courts as a means of solving some of these problems,
you have to accept the guidelines presented. Otherwise, we are going
to become even more litigious and the lack of uniformity which Professor Valente decries will continue. On the other hand, how you
frame the prayer for relief, so to speak, becomes even more critical
than ever in terms of getting to the proper solution.
MR. JOHNSTON: We have been talking about judicial restraint without really talking about it. Perhaps what the Court is really
saying is that it is getting tired of having to deal with things like the
proper and fairest method of financing education and reapportionment
and all these other things that really ought to be dealt with by the more
political and more democratic branches. Perhaps, the court is looking
to the school system to develop citizens who will have a higher concept of fairness and justice when they elect legislators and serve as
state legislators. The real hope may be to be able, at sometime in the
future, to draw back into the more proper role for the least democratic branch of our government.
QUESTION: I would like to ask Dean Vanderzell and Mr.
Finkin what they think the role of the law should be in protecting or
dealing with a faculty member who is being dismissed when he comes
up for tenure?
DEAN VANDERZELL: I think my lay position will color the
response that I -make. I do not have any hesitancy at all in endorsing
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the decision of a court, as long as the court insists that the procedures
employed by the institution are fair ones. My hope would be that the
courts would be hospitable to administrative due process, and that the
courts would differentiate between the burden cast on the institution
and on a professor in a tenured situation as opposed to a nontenured
situation. Just off the top of my head those appear to be the major
concerns.
MR. FINKIN: Certainly the organization I am affiliated with
has developed well defined procedural standards with respect to dismissal of faculty, tenured and nontenured, and has most recently, almost
a year ago today, adopted a statement of policy dealing with procedural
standards for the nonrenewal of nontenured faculty - which is not a
dismissal but rather the non-reappointment of a nontenured faculty
member. Now with Roth,' Sindermann,4 and a host of other cases
before the Supreme Court, we will know what the courts are doing in
this area very shortly. I would hope, however, that the Court would
accept the traditions and customs of the profession itself, the kind of
self-policing mechanism which most professions, including the Bar,
have adopted, and would give due weight and deference to their
judgments as long as their judgments are made pursuant to the institution's own regulations, the norms of the profession, or both. I
guess the leading case right now, certainly the one that is in most of
the papers involves Bruce Franklin at Stanford University. Let me
footnote this by saying that I do not appear on this panel as a spokesman for the AAUP, my remarks are purely personal, and the AAUP
has no position with respect to the Franklin case. In fact, it should be
pointed out that Professor Franklin is not a complainant before the
AAUP. According to the press accounts, the hearings of the Franklin
case were public with a vengeance. As you may know, the hearings
were on closed circuit television. Any member of the Stanford University community - students, faculty, janitors, and the public could probably have viewed the case. The hearing report is a very
lengthy document and, on a basis simply of general procedural knowledge, it seems to me that Professor Franklin was accorded full procedural due process. I would hope that a court, in reviewing that
judgment, would give due weight to a judgment of an elected faculty
committee of Professor Franklin's peers and not substitute its decision

on the merits.
3. Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 92 S. Ct. 2701

(1972).

4. Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 939 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 92 S. Ct. 2694
(1972).
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If a profession with its own conditions and attitudes says to itself
that conduct unbecoming a faculty member shall be grounds for dismissal of faculty members then a faculty member should get specific
charges listing the events and instances, which in the administration's
opinion, constitute adequate cause to dismiss. There should be a full
adversarial hearing, with the burden of proof resting on the administration, before an elected faculty committee. The faculty member
could then wage his defense or place any other matters before that
committee. The committee might find that the professor's conduct fell
afoul of the standard, weigh it in the balance, and recommend the
termination of his appointment.
Is it well advised for a court to say that a reasonable man could
not have known that such conduct would fall afoul of the standards,
or that he did not know the standards because they were vague and
overbroad. If a court does so, however, then I think we are going
to get into the situation where courts are going to be drafting rules
of conduct, in effect, faculty criminal codes, in the same sense that
the faculty tends to issue such codes to students, and that would
accelerate sharply the growth of creeping legalism and approach, as
one commentator has called it, "galloping legalism."

PROFESSOR VALENTE: The administrator has a dilemma.
If he tries to make his regulation broad enough to cover a whole class
of activity, as a practical matter, he runs the risk of being vague and
overbroad. By the same token he does not have the prescience,
prophecy, and precision to describe every possible variation of student
conduct.
Administrators cannot be expected to be as resourceful as students,
at least in advance. If I may, I would like to cite a line of cases on
vagueness to demonstrate the problem. Is "misconduct" too vague a
word? Soglin' held that it was. Banks,6 Norton,7 and Esteban" held
that it was not -

these are all from federal courts of appeals. Is

"incorrigible" too vague a word? One court held that it was not.
It seems to me incorrigible is a very difficult concept. Is "immoral"
too vague? One case held that as to a teacher it was, and that word
appears in many education codes. Is a ban on provocative symbols too
vague? One court held that it was. Is "responsible social conduct" too
5. Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969).
6. Banks v. Board of Pub. Instruction,
vacated, 401 U.S. 988 (to allow timely appeal),
7. Norton v. Discipline Comm., 419 F.2d
U.S. 906 (1970).
8. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College,
denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).

314 F. Supp. 285 (S.D. Fla. 1970),
aff'd, 450 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1971).
195 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399
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vague? One court held that it was not. So you see there is a very
difficult problem in avoiding the business of overbreadth and vagueness.
Now, it seems to me, that as difficult as Mr. Finkin's problem is at
the higher level, at least you have a national association which is
struggling with the problem on a nation-wide basis. However, I
wonder, and I would like Dr. Shedd to respond to this, if the National
Association of School Administrators or the National Association of
School Superintendents, has ever tried to sit down and work out some
minimal criteria of reasonable and fair standards in regulations and
also on this problem of vagueness and overbreadth. I am not aware
that this 'has been attempted at the lower level.
DR. SHEDD: While I cannot cite anything specifically, I know
that there are publications coming out of the American Association of
School Administrators and National Association of Secondary School
Principals that give some guidance, and they do run national and
regional workshops for principals, covering these areas of student
rights, faculty rights, and the other areas that you mentioned. But
this is always with the understanding that practice, and sometimes the
law, varies from state to state.
PROFESSOR DOWD: Well, we have time for a few more
questions before we have terminal legalism.
QUESTION: Do students in non-public schools leave their
constitutional rights behind them when they enter a private school?
If Mary Beth Tinker were a student at Cardinal Dougherty High
School in Philadelphia, would she still have 'her first amendment
guarantees ?
MR. JOHNSTON: I believe it would be different; as to the
degree of difference, that is a question on which I am not really an
expert. I believe the concern of the courts is for an educational system
that makes a substantial contribution to the development of free men
and democratic citizens, which is as important for private education
as it is for public education. If private education wants support from
the public sector, which I am aware it does, then it is going to have to
convince me, as a citizen, that it is making that kind of contribution,
but if it is simply educating people in a totalitarian environment to
become subjects of a totalitarian state, then it is not deserving of any
public support. In fact, if it creates that kind of threat to our free
society, perhaps it should be prohibited.
PROFESSOR VALENTE: I think that, purely as a matter
of good education, that question should be avoided. In other words,
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the students' interest in expression and privacy should be respected in
all schools, whether or not there is a state action to bring the limitations
of the fourteenth amendment into that school.
There are, however, certain rights which clearly have legal force

behind them in private institutions, as well as in public institutions.
Certainly in the area of privacy, where a fee is paid for a locker, it
seems to me a court can, as a matter of contract law, say that the
school administration does not have a right to invade the locker.
Similarly, there are two or three private college cases where there
have been unlawful searches of dormitories, and the courts have held
that such were invasions of the student's privacy.
QUESTION: Have there been any legal decisions regarding
the question of the confidentiality of students in the secondary schools?
That's for anybody who can answer it.
MR. JOHNSTON: In Ohio we have a statute that establishes
confidentiality, and the courts uniformly consider that outside that
statute there is no confidentiality.
QUESTION: I'm not certain that I understand. I am a counsellor. How much must a counsellor reveal to an administrator and
how much must a counsellor reveal to a parent?
MR. FINKIN: I am familiar with only a few incidents. It is
an unsettled area. In a raid on the State University of New York at
Stoneybrook, there were about 80 or 90 policemen and five photographers who raided the campus at five in the morning without the
knowledge of the administration. This was followed by both a legislative and grand jury investigation. The issue posed in that incident
was with respect to the knowledge of faculty members that particular
students may have been using marijuana or dangerous drugs. The
faculty argued that they came into that knowledge on a confidential
basis because of the trust placed in them by the students. The faculty
members were given immunity by the grand jury, but when they refused to name names, they went to jail. The issue is posed once again,
although in a somewhat different light, with respect to the confidentiality of research information, in the case of Professor Popkins at
Harvard. Popkins was a professor of government working in the
Vietnam area and knew people who were familiar with the Pentagon
Papers. He was called by the grand jury to testify when and with
whom he spoke about the Pentagon Papers. An unofficial transcript
of the grand jury minutes were published in The Harvard Crimson.
According to that paper, Popkins consistently took the position that he
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would not name names because he interviewed these people in his
professional capacity as a research scholar, and there would be a
chilling effect on the freedom of such people, namely government
officials, to discuss momentous events with interested scholars, for fear
that their names might be given to the grand jury and they themselves
might be investigated. Popkins was found in contempt and the case is
now being litigated. My guess is that the case will be treated in
virtually the same manner as the news reporter cases, but with one
difference; that is, there is no first amendment right to research.
Since, I believe, it is the law of New York that there is no confidentiality privilege unless the privilege is specifically awarded by statute and
since there is no such statutory privilege for college professors or counsellors, the Stoneybrook people will have to suffer the consequences.
DR. SHEDD: I am not aware that these questions for counsellors have been answered sufficiently in the courts. My guess is that
before long we will get some cases. I am aware, for example, of one
case where a student is saying "I'm entitled to know everything that
you've got on me" - you being the counsellor. The student claimed
that he and his parents had a right to know what information the school
has, including the student's I.Q., -his school performance, or any other
records about the student, and further claimed that the school does not
have a right to keep such records unless the student knows about it.
I am not aware that there has been any decision on that case, but it is
one that bears watching. As far as the other position - what is the
counsellor's responsibility to the school community concerning information passed by the student to the counsellor in confidence? -

I

am not sure that there are any cases on this point either. These people
must exercise some discretion in judgment, not only in regard to what
is in the best interest of the individual student so as to maintain the
confidentiality of that relationship, but also in regard to being a school
person, sharing responsibility for the health, well-being, and safety of
the entire school community. All of these concerns must be balanced
and this necessarily includes exercising some discretion. In my opinion,
if I thought the rest of the school was in danger, I would run the risk
of being taken to court for abusing the confidentiality of the information a student had given me. I think that in' our society today there is
ample evidence of the tragic consequences of not doing just that.
PROFESSOR DOWD: There is another facet of this problem
which ought to be considered. Perhaps one should reconsider the kind
of records he really wants to keep in a counselling situation. For instance, in the pre-probation area, one of the ways in which they can
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offer some assurance of confidentiality is by having no records. Not
that they are lying about it, but in a number of cases certain kinds of
notations are just not made. It seems to me, therefore, that if you
are not sure about your confidentiality, you really ought to review
what kind of records you want to be keeping about people. This is a
very important aspect from your own point of view.
PROFESSOR VALENTE: The counsellor-confidentiality situation is the perfect illustration of the need for careful study because
the problem has many levels. How did the information come to you?
Is it a counsellor-student confidentiality, rather than a student informer? For what purpose are you disclosing and how far? If it is
purely internal and administrative, that is one problem. If you export
it to the police, that is another. A different approach may have to be
taken depending upon the differing uses to which you put this information. The answer has to be designed to fit different discrete
situations. There is no simple answer to your question.
PROFESSOR DOWD: I think we have had a very interesting afternoon, but I am afraid that terminal legalism is setting in and
we have to conclude. I want to thank, first of all, the hard working
members of the Villanova Law Review who organized the Symposium
and who will be in charge of seeing that it comes out in the June issue,
so that you can have a chance to read what you have heard - amplified
and, undoubtedly, corrected. I also want to thank, of course the panel
for a stimulating, interesting discussion. Lastly, but by no means
least, I want to thank all of you for being with us.
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